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Abstract—We investigate the problem of secure communication
in a simple network with three communicating parties, two
distributed sources who communicate over orthogonal channels
to one destination node. The cooperation between the sources
is restricted to a rate limited common random source they
both observe. The communication channels are erasure channels
with strictly causal channel state information of the destination
available publicly. A passive adversary is present in the system
eavesdropping on any one of the channels. We design a linear
scheme that ensures secrecy against the eavesdropper. By deriving
an outer bound for the problem we prove that the scheme is
optimal in certain special cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have significantly deepened our funda-
mental understanding on how to send information over wire-
less networks – while our understanding on how to securely
send this information has not reached the same depth as yet.
Network coding, interference alignment and the deterministic-
approximation approach are examples of powerful techniques
that take advantage of the network environment to enable
information transfer at substantial bandwidth and throughput
benefits. But if we also want to send this information securely,
we have not yet developed a comparable set of techniques.
In this paper, we take the first steps in understanding how we
can construct security in erasure networks with (erasure state)
feedback. We want to use three resources wireless networks
offer: the existence of feedback (today part of all wireless
standards); the possibility of selecting and using multiple
paths; and the wireless channel variability and unpredictability.
We note that several interesting works have looked at secrecy
over networks [1]–[4], but without feedback: yet it is well
known that even for a point-to-point channel, use of feedback
can significantly increase the achievable secrecy rates [5]–[7].
Our starting point are two insights from our previous
work [7], [8], where we have looked at the secret message
capacity of a source, Alice sending private messages to
multiple receivers through a broadcast erasure channel with
state feedback. First, in all cases where we were able to
characterize the message capacity, it was optimal to use an
achievability scheme with two phases, a key-generation and a
key-consumption phase. That is, we create in the first phase
a secret key between the source Alice and each user (say
Bob), and in the second phase use this key to encrypt the
private message Alice has to send. Second, we showed that
the amount of key we need to secure a message can be much
smaller than the message itself, unlike the classical one-time
pad that requires a message-length key.
To these two insights, we add in this paper a first un-
derstanding on how to use common randomness across in-
termediate network nodes. We started our work from the
relay (diamond) network depicted in Figure 1a, where we
aim to secure a unicast session from S to D against Eve,
who can eavesdrop through a broadcast erasure channel at an
(unknown) node. Note that when the source Alice broadcasts
random packets with the purpose of key generation, these
might be overhead by L1, or L2, or both, in the latter case
creating common randomness. In fact, Alice can control the
amount of common randomness through retransmissions and
coding schemes. A crucial observation we extracted from our
preliminary examination of the diamond network is that, the
performance of secrecy schemes is significantly affected by
this amount of common randomness the intermediate nodes
L1 and L2 have.
To understand how much common randomness to create and
how to use it, we took a step back, and considered instead
the simplified subnetwork in Fig. 1b. We have two distributed
source nodes (modeling L1 and L2) both connected through an
erasure channel to a common destination node. The sources
have access to a common rate limited random source. The
channels are assumed independent and orthogonal (e.g., in
different frequency bands). The eavesdropper is allowed to
either overhear – through a broadcast erasure channel – the
transmissions of node S1 or node S2, but not both.
Even this simplified setting turns out to be challenging. Our
characterization of the rate-region for the special case where
the two sources aim to convey a common message is non-
trivial (a linear program involving 8 inequalities). The inner
for the general case is even more involved.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives our
model and definitions. In Section III we summarize our results.
We provide our scheme in Section IV. In Section V we
describe our proof technique for an outer bound. We discuss
a special case in Section VI.
II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider the network in Figure 1b where two sources
S1 and S2 have each a private message, W1 and W2, as well
as a common message W , to send to a destination D, such












(b) Two sources network
Figure 1: Our networks
a) Communication: Each source Sk, k = 1, 2, commu-
nicates with D using a broadcast erasure channel with erasure
probability δk; the channels S1−D and S2−D are orthogonal
(e.g. operate in different frequency bands), andD is capable of
receiving simultaneously over both. We will refer to S1−D as
channel 1 and S2−D as channel 2. Eve overhears packets in
one (but not both) of these channels, with erasure probability
δkE and independently from D. Since the location of Eve is
not known, we can equivalently assume that there are two
eavesdroppers E1 and E2 eavesdropping on channels 1 and 2
respectively, who do not share their knowledge with each
other, and we want to protect the messages against both.
The channel inputs are length L vectors of Fq symbols,
which we call packets. To simplify notation, throughout the
paper we express entropy and rate in terms of packets, which
allows us to omit the constant factor L log q. We denote by
Xi = [X1i, X2i] the inputs of channel 1 and channel 2 in
the ith transmission, while Yi = [Y1i, Y2i] is the output D
observes. The outputs E1 and E2 observe are Zi = [Z1i, Z2i].
After the ith transmission, D causally sends a public acknowl-
edgment Fi ∈ {1, 2, 1&2, ∅}, to indicate whether he received
correctly over channel 1, channel 2, both channels, or neither
channel. More formally, we have that:
Pr {Y1i, Y2i, Z1i, Z2i|Xi}
= Pr {Y1i|X1i}Pr {Y2i|X2i}Pr {Z1i|X1i}Pr {Z2i|X2i}
Pr {Yk,i|Xk,i} =
{
1− δk, Yk,i = [Xk,i Fi]
δk, Yk,i = Fi,
, k ∈ {1, 2}
Pr {Zk,i|Xk,i} =
{
1− δkE , Zk,i = [Xk,i Fi]
δkE , Zk,i = Fi,
, k ∈ {1, 2}
b) Random sources: We assume that S1 and S2 have
access to a common random source of limited rate, that
produces i.i.d. uniformly random packets with entropy rate Cr.
We denote by Ψ the set of random packets produced. We also
assume that both sources can generate private randomness Θ1,
Θ2 of unlimited rate, independently of each other and from
any other randomness in the system.
c) Security and reliability: We assume that the messages
W1,W2 andW consist of N1, N2 and N packets respectively.
The messages are independent of each other. A secure com-
munication scheme has five parameters (N1, N2, N, ǫ, n) and
satisfies the following reliability and security conditions:
Definition 1. A (N1, N2, N, ǫ, n)–scheme has two sets of
encoding functions f1i and f2i as well as a decoding map
φ. The channel inputs at S1 and S2 are computed as
X1i = f1i(W1,W,Ψ,Θ1, F
i−1),
X2i = f2i(W2,W,Ψ,Θ2, F
i−1), ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The messages are decoded correctly with high probability:
Pr {φ(Y n) 6= (W1,W2,W )} < ǫ.
Furthermore, the messages remain secure from E1 and E2:
I(W1,W2,W ;Z
n
1 ) < ǫ, I(W1,W2,W ;Z
n
2 ) < ǫ. (1)
Our goal is to find the achievable rate tuples (R1, R2, R):
Definition 2. A rate tuple (R1, R2, R) ∈ R3+ is achievable if
for any ǫ > 0 there exists a (N1, N2, N, ǫ, n)–scheme which
satisfies
R1 − ǫ <
1
n
N1, R2 − ǫ <
1
n




The following definition specifies the notion of secret key
rate, which we use when describing our scheme.
Definition 3. We say that a key generation step of S1 achieves
a certain key rate Kr if for any ǫ
′′ > 0 there is a large enough
n for which at the end of the step both S1 and D can compute






|K|; I(K;Zκ1 ) < ǫ
′′, (2)
where κ is the number of transmissions done during the key
generation step.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
We make two main contributions. First, we propose a
(N1, N2, N, ǫ, n)–scheme that achieves the rate region de-
scribed by the linear program LP1 in Theorem 1 (the detailed
description of the variables can be found in Section IV). This
scheme uses new techniques, as illustrated through an example
in Section IV-A.
Theorem 1. If the following linear program LP1 is feasible
with all parameter values nonnegative, then (R1, R2, R) is an
achievable rate tuple.
R1 +R2 +R = (1− δ1)m1 + (1− δ2)m2 (3)
R1 ≤ (1− δ1)m1; R2 ≤ (1 − δ2)m2 (4)
Cr ≥ c+ r1 + r2 (5)









(1− δ1E)(1 − δ1)
1− δ1δ1E




+ (c1 + k1)δ1E(1− δ1) (8)
m2
(1− δ2E)(1 − δ2)
1− δ2δ2E




+ (c2 + k2)δ2E(1− δ2) (9)
(1− δ1δ1E)c1 + (1 − δ2)c2 ≤ c (10)
(1− δ2δ2E)c2 + (1 − δ1)c1 ≤ c (11)
Second, we derive a matching outer bound for the case when
there are no private messages (R1 = R2 = 0), showing that in
this case our scheme is optimal. The outer bound is in the form
of another linear program LP2, which unfortunately involves
31 constraints and is thus delegated to an extended version of
this paper [9]. Our proof of optimality shows that the optimal
value of LP1 and LP2 coincides.
We conjecture the optimality of our scheme in general, yet
we currently have a proof only for the case without private
messages. We provide the complete proofs in [9].
Theorem 2. The rate tuple (R1 = 0, R2 = 0, R) is achievable
if and only if LP1 is feasible with nonnegative parameter
values.
IV. THE PROPOSED (N1, N2, N, ǫ, n)–SCHEME
Our scheme uses the two-phase approach in [7], [8], where
in a first phase we create secret keys, and in the second phase
we consume them (in fact, we can retrieve the optimal scheme
in [7] as a special case of our scheme by using parameter
values R2 = 0, R = 0 and Cr = 0). More specifically:
1) Key generation phase: We create a secret key K1
between S1 and D that is secret from E1, and a secret key K2
between S2 and D that is secret from E2. That is, our scheme
is such that for any ǫ′ > 0 there exists a large enough n with:
I(K1;Z
κ1
1 ) < ǫ
′; I(K2;Z
κ2
2 ) < ǫ
′, (12)
where κ1, κ2 are the number of transmissions (out of the total
n) that S1 and S2 each allocate to the key generation phase
(with the remaining tranmissions to be used in the message
sending phase). Note that since E1 and E2 each overhears
only one channel, and they do not collude, the keys K1 and
K2 do not need to be independent.
2) Encrypted message transmission phase: We appropri-
ately split the common message W to two parts, and allocate
to each source one part to send to D. Then, each source uses
her own key and the same technique as in [7] to send over
her channel the packets she is responsible for.
The new ideas in our scheme are in the key generation, since
the encryption uses the same approach as in [7]. In particular,
on how we use the common randomness. We illustrate next
the basic principles using a simplified example.
A. Use of common randomness - a simplified example
The set of common random packets Ψ that both S1 and
S2 have is a valuable resource for rate-efficient secret key
generation, and to optimally use it we need to go beyond the
techniques in [7]. To illustrate, we make in this subsection a
simplifying assumption, that S1, S2, and D (causally) know
which packets the eavesdroppers E1 and E2 have received.
We underline that our scheme does not require any of the
Table I: The packet X1 can be used in both keys
Packet D E1 E2 Key for S1 Key for S2
S1 sends X1 X × X X
parties to have this additional eavesdroppers’ channel state
feedback, as we describe in the next subsection. We make
three observations, that form the basis of our approach.
a) The same packet can be used in both keys: Our first
observation is that, thanks to the common randomness, random
packets sent through one of the channels can be used as keys
on the other channel as well. Assume S1 sends a packet from
Ψ, say X1, over her channel 1 and D successfully receives
it. If E1 does not receive this packet (which will happen with
a certain probability), S1 can use this packet for her key K1.
But, since S2 also has all the packets in Ψ including X1, and
since D now has X1, X1 can always be used for the key K2.
Indeed, X1 was never sent over the channel 2, and thus E2
knows nothing about it. In other words, the transmission of a
single packet X1 can contribute to both keys K1 and K2, to
K1 with a certain probability, and to K2 always, provided that
the destination D receives it. Table I shows the case where X1
contributes to both keys.
b) Retransmissions of the same packet can help: Since
X1, if successfully received, can always be used in key K2,
it may be worth trying to retransmit X1 so that D receives it.
Although retransmissions also increase the probability that E1
overhearsX1, there is still a non-zero probability that E1 does
not do so, in which case X1 can also be used in K1 (Table II
shows this case). Thus retransmissions can be useful, more
useful than S1 sending a packet from her private randomness
Θ1 that can only contribute to her own key K1.
Table II: Retransmissions
Packet D E1 E2 Key for S1 Key for S2
S1 sends X1 × × × ×
S1 sends X1 X × X X
c) Transmission of linear combinations of unsuccessfully
received packets can help: As illustrated in Table III, assume
that S1 sends X1 ∈ Ψ that E1 receives but D does not.
Moreover, S2 sends X2 ∈ Ψ that E2 receives but D does
not. Now X1 definitely cannot contribute to key K1, and
X2 definitely cannot contribute to the key K2. Thus, if we
attempt to retransmit one of these packets, say S2 attempts
to retransmit X2, this transmission will not be useful for S2
herself. But assume instead that S2, since she also has X1,
retransmits X1 ⊕ X2, and assume that D receives this new
packet while E1 and E2 do not. This transmission,X1⊕X2, is
more useful than simply retransmitting X2, since the received
packet can now be used both in K1 and K2. Indeed, E1 only
has X1, and does not know X1 ⊕X2; similarly, E2 only has
X2 and also does not know this packet. In other words, we
take advantage of the fact that none of the eavesdroppers has
received both packets X1 and X2, to create a new packet both
sources still have and is also secret from both eavesdroppers.
In a sense, we perform a form of “privacy amplification”
before transmission, to make our transmissions as efficient as
possible.
Table III: Coding across unsuccessfully received packets
Packet D E1 E2 Key for S1 Key for S2
S1 sends X1 × X × ×
S2 sends X2 × X × ×
S2 sends X1 ⊕X2 X × X X
Of course, in our scheme S1, S2 andD will not know which
packets exactly the eavesdropper has received; the take away
message from the above is that, to be efficient, we can use
coding to make the transmissions of common random packets
as innovative as possible with respect to what Eve has received.
B. Detailed description
Our scheme uses some parameters that also appear in LP1
given in Theorem 1. The constraints of the LP capture the
feasibility of the scheme. S1 and S2 carry out similar steps in
parallel. We describe the steps of S1, the steps of S2 follows
from symmetry. We will see that the description relies on the
properties that Lemmas 1-4 ensure. We provide the proofs of
these Lemmas in [9].
Initialization
• From the common message packets W , assign N ′ to S1
and the remaining N ′′ to S2, where N = N ′+N ′′. We denote
by W ′ the N1 packets from W1 together with the N ′ packets
from W , i.e. the set of N1+N ′ message packets S1 needs to
deliver. Similarly, W ′′ is the set of N2 +N ′′ packets of S2.
• Split the common randomness Ψ (or potentially a part of
it) into three disjoint sets of random packets:
H(Ψ) ≥ n(c+ r1 + r2). (13)
We assign nr1 packets to S1 and nr2 packets to S2. The third
part, nc packets will be used commonly.
• S1 and S2 generate nk1 and nk2 random packets from
their private randomness.
Key generation
• Step 2.1: S1 sends the nr1 packets assigned to it such that
every packet is repeated until D correctly receives. Recall that
the channel state is available, hence the source knows when to
stop repeating a certain packet. S1 does privacy amplification
on these packets to get a secret key.
Lemma 1. Step 2.1 achieves a secret key rate r1
δ1E(1−δ1)
1−δ1δ1E
using no more than nr11−δ1
transmissions.
• Step 2.2: The packets sent by S2 in the parallel step of
Step 2.1 that S2 performs become part of the key of S1.
Lemma 2. Step 2.2 achieves a secret key of rate r2 without
using channel 1.
• Step 2.3: The nc packets from the common randomness
are arranged into a L log q×nc matrix C. Out of these packets
nc1 + nc2 linear combination packets are produced to be
sent by S1 and S2 respectively. The linear combinations are
produced as follows:
[C1 C2] = C ×G,
where G is a nc× n(c1 + c2) matrix and is a generator of an
MDS code, C1 is a matrix of size L log q × nc1 containing
the nc1 packets to be sent by S1, C2 is of size L log q× nc2.
S1 sends the packets in C1 once over the channel. Again a
privacy amplification step is done.
• Step 2.4: Packets successfully received from C2 (sent by
S2) contribute to the key of S1, which allows an additional
key rate of c2(1− δ2).
Lemma 3. If
(1− δ1δ1E)c1 + (1− δ2)c2 ≤ c (14)
holds, then in Steps 2.3-2.4 a secret keyK1,2 of rate c1δ1E(1−
δ1) + c2(1− δ2) can be established between S1 and D using
no more than nc1 transmissions on the S1 −D and nc2
transmissions on the S2 −D channel.
We note that Lemma 3 also ensures that the keys generated
in Step 2.3 and in Step 2.4 are independent.
• Step 2.5: S1 sends the nk1 i.i.d. uniformly random pack-
ets generated from private randomness. Again, after privacy
amplification a key is gained.
Lemma 4. Step 2.5 achieves a secret key rate k1δ1E(1− δ1)
using nk1 transmissions.
Overall we see that S1 can produce a key with rate:




In different steps of the key generation different random
sources are used to produce keys, thus
• the keys computed in different steps are independent, so
summing the key rate of each step correctly gives the overall
rate of key generation,
• the eavesdropper cannot learn anything about a key
produced in one step during another step, so the secrecy
properties shown for the individual steps equally hold for the
whole key, i.e. (12) is satisfied.




+ c1 + k1
)
transmissions in the key generation phase.
Encrypted message sending
• Let K1 denote the secret key set up between S1 and D.
Out of these key packets S1 produces N1 + N ′ encryption
keys K ′1 computed as K
′
1 = K1GK1 , where GK1 is the
generator of an MDS code. The number of rows of GK1 is
the number of key packets generated (see Lemmas 1-4 for the
exact numbers), and it has N1 +N ′ columns. The encrypted
packets are produced using a one-time-pad encryption with
these encryption keys: W ′ =W ′ ⊕K ′1.
• Each of the N1+N ′ encrypted packets in W ′ is repeated
by S1 until D receives.
The other source S2 performs a similar encryption to deliver
the N ′′ message packets assigned to it.
From [7] it is known that over the S1 − D channel this
construction achieves a secret message rate (1− δ1)m1 using















Secure capacity with Eve’s location known
Secure capacity with infinite common randomness
Secure capacity with 0.3 rate common randomness
Secure capacity without feedback
Figure 2: Achieved common message rate for a number of
scenaria
Constraints (3)-(4) of Theorem 1 ensure that proper splitting
of the common message is possible as well as both sources
can deliver their private message, (5) comes from the initial
splitting of Ψ (see (13)), (6)-(7) restrict the overall number of
transmissions to n on each channel, (8)-(9) come from (15)
and (IV-B), while constraints (10)-(11) are the conditions of
Lemma 3.
The scheme description together with the referred lemmas
give the proof of Theorem 1.
V. OUTER BOUND – PROOF TECHNIQUE
The proof technique we use for the outer bound is the
following [9]. We build another linear program by showing
general constraints (linear inequalities) on the achievable rate
expressed in terms of various entropy and mutual information
terms. We then treat every such term as a nonnegative variable






i−1Zi−12 W ) + I(W ;X1i|Y
i−1),
then define variables h1z2 =
∑n
i=1H(X1i|Y




i−1), which turns the inequality into
a linear constraint of our LP. Solving the resulting program
for the maximum rate provides us an upper bound. We finally
prove that the linear program that we derive with this method
has the same optimal value as the linear program in Theorem 1.
VI. SPECIAL CASE: TWO PARALLEL CHANNELS
For the special case when R1 = 0, R2 = 0, Cr = ∞,
one can easily see that the problem becomes equivalent to
the setting in Figure 3, i.e., a single source connected to a
receiver by two parallel orthogonal channels. What makes this
problem nontrivial is that we do not know which channel the
eavesdropper selects: even if δ1 = δ1E = δ2 = δ2E , that is,
the two channels are statistically identical, it is not possible
to achieve the rate we could if we knew which channel Eve
is eavesdropping on (in contrast to wiretap networks where
this was possible [3]). Figure 2 shows the difference in the
common rate R (assuming R1 = R2 = 0) we can achieve
if we send non-securely, send securely while knowing Eve’s
location or not (with infinite common randomness), and having




Figure 3: Special case: parallel channels
the secure capacity without feedback and assuming common
randomness of rate at least (1− δ1) [2].
For the case when R1 = 0, R2 = 0, Cr = ∞, we have
seen that our scheme is optimal. Thanks to the unlimited rate
common randomness, we can simplify the scheme: there is
no need for retransmissions in the key generation phase, and
there is no need to use private randomness, i.e., r1 = r2 =
k1 = k2 = 0. In the linear program that describes the scheme
constraints (4)-(5) and (10)-(11) are not needed any more.
Theorem 3. The special case when R1 = R2 = 0, Cr = ∞
the message rate R is achievable if and only if the following
LP is feasible with nonnegative parameter values.
R = (1− δ1)m1 + (1− δ2)m2








≤ c1(1− δ1) + c2δ2E(1− δ2)
The “if” part of the theorem is already shown by the scheme
described in Section IV. We give the complete proof in the
extended version of this paper [9].
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